Metaphysical Positions
Eternalism
Time
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Eternalism holds that all moments of time, past, present, and future alike, are equally real, forming a single four-dimensional block in which nothing is metaphysically privileged as the uniquely existing now. The view draws heavily on Einstein's special relativity, which shows that simultaneity, and therefore what counts as the present moment, is relative to an observer's frame of reference, making a single, universally shared now difficult to locate physically. Presentists, who hold that only the present moment is real, reject the picture directly. What is at stake is whether the future is already, in some sense, out there waiting, no less real than the past, or whether it remains genuinely open and not yet existent until it arrives, a question with real consequences for how free will and change themselves are understood.
Facts
Position Profile
Earliest FormulationModern eternalism follows from Hermann Minkowski's 1908 four-dimensional reformulation of Einstein's special relativity, though the view that time is like space in lacking any privileged now echoes Parmenides' ancient denial of change and becoming. 1 Principal ProponentEternalism draws its strongest modern support from Einstein's special relativity and the relativity of simultaneity it establishes. 1 Principal CriticC.D. Broad's growing block theory rejected full eternalism, arguing that the future is not yet real even though the past, once formed, persists on equal footing with the present. 1 Key TextHermann Minkowski's 1908 address Space and Time, which recast Einstein's relativity as a single four-dimensional spacetime and gave eternalism its modern technical foundation. 1 Opposing PositionPresentism, which holds that only the present moment is real and the future does not yet exist. 1 Learn More
The Universe as a Single Block
Eternalism's strongest scientific support comes from special relativity's relativity of simultaneity: two events that one observer, moving at a certain velocity, judges to happen at exactly the same moment, another observer, moving differently, will judge to happen at different times, with neither observer's frame of reference privileged as the correct one, which makes the very idea of a single, objective present moment shared across the universe difficult to sustain physically.
If there is no privileged present, eternalists argue, then there is no principled physical basis for saying the past has ceased to exist while the future has not yet begun to; instead, all events at all times are equally real, differing from one another only in their position along the time dimension, much as different places differ only in their position along a spatial dimension, an analogy that gives the view its common name, the block universe. On this picture, change and the felt passage of time are not features built into the fabric of reality itself but features of how a conscious observer, embedded at one location within the block, experiences moving through it, in something like the way a person reading a novel experiences the story unfolding page by page even though the entire book, beginning to end, already exists complete on the shelf.
A View Most Traditions Resist Without Quite Refuting
Eternalism sits uneasily against most religious pictures of time, which generally treat the future as genuinely open, not yet decided, and treat human choices as making a real difference to what becomes real rather than merely revealing what, in some higher sense, was already there all along; process theology in particular was developed specifically to preserve this kind of openness against any deterministic or eternalist block, insisting that even God experiences time's passage and does not simply survey a completed four-dimensional universe from outside it.
Eternalists reply that the metaphysical reality of all moments existing does not by itself settle whether the future is determined or undetermined, since a block universe can, in principle, still contain genuinely undetermined events at later coordinates, so eternalism and determinism, though often discussed together, are not strictly the same claim and need not stand or fall together. The dispute with presentism remains largely unresolved within physics itself: relativity is widely taken as strong evidence for eternalism, but some philosophers of physics argue a suitably reformulated presentism, keyed to each observer's own reference frame rather than to a single universal now, can still be made consistent with relativistic physics, keeping the debate active rather than settled by science alone.
Cross-Tradition Connections
Opposes
Eternalism holds all times are equally real; presentism holds only the present moment is real.
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