Ibadism's political theory is its most distinctive feature and the one with the most direct modern consequence.
Where Sunnis require descent from Quraysh for the caliph and Shia require descent from the Prophet through Ali, Ibadis require neither. The imam should be the most upright and capable believer available, chosen by the scholars and notables of the community, and he may be deposed if he fails in justice or competence. Any qualified Muslim may hold the office regardless of lineage or origin. Ibadi thought also developed the position that the community may live legitimately without an imam when no fit candidate exists, a state of concealment, in which religion is maintained privately and no rebellion is required.
That theory was put into practice. An Ibadi imamate existed in Oman from the eighth century, in the Rustamid state in what is now Algeria until 909, and among Berber communities in the Maghreb. Oman is the only country in the world with an Ibadi majority, and the imamate persisted there in the interior in tension with the coastal sultanate until the two were merged by force in the 1950s.
The communities today are small: Oman, where Ibadis are usually estimated at somewhere near half to two-thirds of nationals; Zanzibar and the East African coast, a legacy of the Omani maritime empire; the Mzab valley of Algeria; Djerba in Tunisia; and the Nafusa mountains of Libya. The global total is commonly put at a few million.
Oman's foreign policy has been read by more than one analyst as an expression of the school's temperament, consistently neutral, on speaking terms with parties who are not on speaking terms with each other, and repeatedly used as a channel between Iran and the West. Whether that is theology or geography is arguable, and both explanations are offered.